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Narrative Ethics and Vulnerability 




The passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990 led to the 
need to define disability and to define the experiences of those with 
disabilities. Because people with disabilities have been considered to 
“deviate” from the able-bodied norm and have been systematically 
oppressed, there came a need to redefine disability in response to the cultural 
and medical narratives that historically associated disability with 
defectiveness, insufficiency, and imperfection.1 With the aid of medicine, the 
goal was to cure the disability and return the body to its original, healthy 
state. Thus, the body that “has the ‘right’ number of smoothly functional 
limbs and organs,” does not “drool, spasm, jerk, wheeze, wheel, limp, 
stutter, piss, or fart uncontrollably either in private or public realms.”2 The 
power to define and regulate impairment, disorder, malfunction, 
disfigurement, or dysfunction in either the body or the brain, lay in the 
hands of medical practitioners. From the medical perspective, disability is 
viewed as something to be overcome and, if it cannot be overcome, then the 
disabled individual is either recommended to an institution or medical care 
at home to be kept out of the public eye.3 Furthermore, it is this perceived 
“deficiency,” particularly in the form of cognitive disability, which has 
caused certain contemporary philosophers in ethics to argue that people 
with cognitive disabilities should no longer retain their autonomous moral 
status as persons. Specifically, philosophers such as Peter Singer and Jeff 
McMahan have argued that people with cognitive disabilities should not be 
entitled to the same societal protections as those with cognitive ability 
“within the normal range.” 4 
 The aim of this paper is argue against the claim of autonomous moral 
status and instead to provide an account of interdependent moral status 
which is based on our relational narrative selfhood. This “traditional” 
account of moral status based on reason and intellectual capacity has 
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ignored the “social” or social construction of disability within culture and 
society. One’s dis-abling condition “exists not as a one-to-one 
correspondence between impairment and the restriction of activity, but as a 
result of society’s failure to have universal access for wheelchair users, such 
as curb cuts, ramps, elevators, and power doors, integrated in the 
environment.”5 Disability is thus a social condition rather than a medical 
condition. As a result, oppression and prejudice function in society insofar 
as they “dis-able” someone through discrimination, inaccessible 
environments and inadequate support. These environmental factors have 
been completely ignored for considerations of moral status and point to the 
latent bias of able-ism within the current models of personhood. Thus, cases 
like “Autism,” Alzheimer’s and other forms of severe cognitive impairment 
call for a refiguring of moral status based on relations for people with 
disabilities. A better account, which I develop here, may be established 
through a narrative ethics of interdependence. In order to establish this 
foundation, I will draw insights from the works of Julia Kristeva and Paul 
Ricoeur. 
The Challenge of Vulnerable Persons for Moral Personhood 
The philosophical problematic of moral status concerns two related 
problems: moral agency and personhood.6  The former includes questions of 
whether individuals with cognitive impairments are able to comprehend 
their actions, are morally imputable, or may be held responsible for their 
actions. The latter include questions concerning whether entities with a 
specific set of attributes qualify as human moral persons. Because the attacks 
on people with disabilities from philosophers such as Singer and McMahan 
focus on the latter problem, I shall concentrate on that aspect of the 
problematic.  
The problem of moral personhood focuses on who is counted as a 
“person.” This question concerns whether an individual will receive dignity, 
rights, and protection within a given society and has been generally grouped 
according to three theories: (1) the genetic humanity theory, (2) the sentience 
theory, and (3) the relationship-based theory.7  Moral personhood grants 
humans, or other beings, moral standing. It is the reason why harming or 
killing humans is considered a greater offense than killing non-human 
animals or harming the environment. Like moral agency, moral personhood 
has been inextricably linked with human reasoning, but it has a much darker 
past for people with disabilities. Because their personhood was not 
recognized, certain people with disabilities were victims of unregulated 
human experimentation. Nazi Germany provides a specific example in this 
case: many people with disabilities were experimented on or exterminated 
because they were deemed having lives “not worthy of being lived.” In the 
United States, the treatment of people with cognitive disabilities at 
Willowbrook State School provides another example of these abuses. 
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Willowbrook was home to hundreds of children with profound cognitive 
impairments, and during 1960s-1970s these children lived in filth, were 
victims of abuse, and even injected with hepatitis supposedly “in order to 
find a cure.”8 These horrors provide a reminder of the significance of the 
challenge of moral personhood.  
Singer and McMahan have called into question the “equal value and 
dignity of all human life” for people with cognitive disabilities. Their aim is 
to reconstruct our concept of “personhood,” with that of human dignity, to 
provide a graduated form of moral status to humans and nonhuman 
animals. Although on the surface this seems to be a noble attempt to 
recognize the dignity of certain species of nonhuman animals, in the end it 
does not grant equal dignity for persons with cognitive impairments and 
able-bodied persons alike. Instead, they contend that those who are 
cognitively impaired should not qualify as “persons” in the same sense as 
able-bodied individuals. 9   
 To make an argument for a graduated form of moral personhood, 
Singer, in his essay “Speciesism and Moral Status,” compares the various 
capabilities of animals, like the great ape Koko, who have basic language 
skills and score between 70-95 on the IQ test with people who have severe or 
profound cognitive impairments and who may not score as high.  His 
comparison draws from capacities listed with the American Association on 
Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities:  (1) Intellectual Quotient (IQ), 
(2) the need for supervision, (3) capacity for speech, (4) following simple 
directions, and (5) social isolation. He uses these factors to compare 
individuals with cognitive impairments with non-human animals such as 
apes, border collies, and grey parrots which have these capacities and 
perform these specific tasks “more efficiently.”10 Rather than granting 
personhood to all biological humans, instead, Singer argues, we should 
“abandon the idea of equal value of all humans, replacing that with a more 
graduated view in which moral status depends on some aspects of cognitive 
ability, and that graduated view is applied both to humans and 
nonhumans.”11 Thus, the implications of questioning, or disqualifying, those 
with cognitive disability from the status of personhood are frightening for 
those with cognitive impairments and those with loved ones who may have 
cognitive impairments. 
In response to this “de-valuation” of human life, philosophers who 
espouse the ability to “empathize” over the “capacity to reason” such as Nel 
Noddings and Agnieszka Jaworska, have argued that moral agency should 
be based on social capacities rather than analytical capacities or the ability to 
carry out a task.12 They contend that humans are moral agents based on 
their ability to connect with others and to reciprocate recognition and 
appreciation, and thus, the ability to care becomes the basis for moral status. 
This capacity to care can be extended to infants and those with cognitive 
impairments, but has limited extension to non-human animals.  
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Such a view might appear to be a suitable response to Singer and 
McMahan, but difficulties nevertheless remain because certain cognitive 
impairments can affect an individual’s social capacities and ability to 
empathize. Specifically, children with “autism” may not respond to eye 
contact, smiles, and may be withdrawn. Among other behavior patterns, 
children with “autism” may appear to “lack empathy.”13 Many dependency 
workers and caregivers of dependent children and elderly parents may not 
find themselves in relations of reciprocity with those for whom they care. As 
a result, this emphasis on social capacities rather than analytical capacities 
turns out to be unable to grant moral personhood to all individuals with 
cognitive impairments.  
At this point, this is a general observation about the difficulty facing any 
strategy for response. It appears that any resonse that hopes to use some 
form of individuated personhood will founder on the same or at least a 
similar rock. So long as one only considers the attributes of an individual 
person, one will end up arbitrarily drawing a line that divides some persons 
from others precisely because they do not “fit.” My suggestion is that the 
main problem of the above views is their reliance on the assumption of 
individuated personhood, measured by individual capabilities. To surmount 
this problem, I argue that moral personhood should be understood as 
relational personhood and that strong evidence in support of relational identity 
can be found in psychoanalysis and developmental psychology. 
A Relational Understanding of Identity  
To develop a relational model of personhood, I would like to begin with 
a testimony from Eva Kittay, who draws on her own experiences raising her 
daughter Sesha to argue for the need of a new construction of personhood 
which accounts for dependence. Kittay’s daughter Sesha has cerebral palsy 
and has profound cognitive impairment. These aspects about Sesha create a 
fundamental dependence in her relations with others:  
While the image of mutuality and interdependence among 
persons is an important one, life with Sesha, underscores 
that there are moments when we are not “inter” 
dependent. We are simply dependent and cannot 
reciprocate. Furthermore, while dependence is often 
socially constructed – all dependence is not. If you have a 
fever of 105, the dependence you have is not socially 
constructed. Sesha’s dependence is not socially 
constructed. Neither “labeling” nor environmental 
impediments create her dependence – although 
environment modifications are crucial for her to have a 
decent life.14 
In other words, Sesha will always be vulnerable in her relations with 
others.15 In response to this vulnerability, Kittay develops an account of 
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what she calls the transparent self, which signifies “a self through whom the 
needs of another are discerned, a self that, when it looks to gauge its own 
needs, sees first the needs of another.”16 This aptly describes, for instance, 
the self of the dependency worker who may or may not be a primary 
caregiver. The relation between the dependency worker and the dependent 
brings to light that our bodies are both interdependent with other bodies 
and dependent upon other bodies.  
 Working from Kittay’s account of the transparent self, what I would 
like to do is to develop further this alternative account of moral personhood 
by drawing on clinical evidence from the work of Julia Kristeva as well as 
the hermeneutic articulation of identity that can be found in Paul Ricoeur.  
Work conducted in both developmental psychology and psychoanalysis 
suggests that our concept of self and our ability to form attachments depend 
on the relations we have with others when we are children. Both 
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology have described how the 
relation between the child and his or her primary caregiver leads to the 
development of the ego, or the self. In psychoanalysis specifically, this 
development takes place through the Oedipal Stage. In the works of 
Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan and later Julia Kristeva, the “male child” is 
understood to be first in union with his “mother.”17 The child believes that 
he is one with the mother and that the mother satisfies all of his desires. In 
the beginning of their relation, the child is unable to tell the difference 
between himself and his mother. This forms an initial bond, called primary 
identification, with the mother.18 Then, the “father” enters the relationship 
and breaks the relation between the child and the mother by laying down 
the “law.” The father breaks up this relation by taking the mother’s attention 
away from the child. The father, metaphorically, tells the child “no” and 
thus establishes for the child that the “little boy” is separate from the 
mother. This “no” forms the beginning of the child’s separate identity. 
According to Kristeva, two possible identifications can be formed in this 
Oedipal Stage:  
a primal one, resulting from a sentimental (Gefühlsbildung 
an ein Objekt), archaic, and ambivalent affection for the 
maternal object, more frequently produced by the impetus 
of guilt-producing hostility; and the other, which 
underlies the introjection into the ego of an object itself 
already libidinal (libidinöse Objektbildung), providing the 
dynamics of the pure loving relationship.19 
Thus, our early relations with our “mother” and “father” shape the relation 
of our ego, the development of our identity, and frame our future relations 
with others.20 Kristeva, however, argues that this relational identity with the 
mother begins prior to language: it begins with the semiotic communication 
and bond during the mother’s pregnancy with the child. 
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To make this argument, Kristeva draws on the experience of her 
own pregnancy. She describes pregnancy as an “instant of time or of dream 
without time; inordinately swollen atoms of a bond, a vision, a shiver, a yet 
formless, unnamable embryo.”21 As pregnant, the mother oscillates between 
union and disunion with her child. Pregnancy and birth question the 
stability of the subject and object positions because “the other cannot be 
separated from the self.”22  The relation of the female body in pregnancy, 
then, blurs the distinction between self and other: just as the mother’s body 
reacts so does the child’s. This maternal relation, which begins in the womb, 
begins to shape the child’s healthy development and continues after birth 
through the practice of loving transference. 
Loving transference is the way of moving not only between the 
language of the symbolic and the murmurings of the semiotic but also 
provides a way of building around the essential loss of the maternal 
relationship as the child develops.23 Maternal love initiates the structure of 
primary narcissism, but is repressed like the drives of ecstasy and death 
through language. Sara Beardsworth, in her essay “Love’s Lost Labors” 
points out the “double indeterminancy” of both the source of love and of the 
lost object: 
This is crucial for [Kristeva’s] presentation of the 
spontaneity and mystery of love: that love, itself, is source. 
It is, first, source of the subject, not only constituting the 
nucleus of the ego in subject formation and making of the 
subject something intrinsically beyond itself but also 
allowing for the return of borders dissolved. In this way, 
love can be the bearer of the trial of going over the loss of 
self. Second, it is the source of the object insofar as the 
bearing of the subject beyond itself underlies all objects of 
desire. Third, it is the source of imaginary formations and 
of loving metaphor. 24  
This act of loving metaphor initiates the beginning of a loving discourse. 
This pure relation of loving transference provides a “bodily dialogue” 
between the caregiver and the child which begins to shape the ego through 
“utterances” prior to language.   
Having developed this model of the loving relation, Kristeva uses it 
to form the foundation for our larger network of relationships. The child 
communicates through gesture and sounds and the primary caregiver 
answers in return. These networks form the healthy (or unhealthy) 
development of the child’s attachments to his or her peers. Our relations 
with others develop first in a secure relation with our primary caregivers 
and this security, (or insecurity), shapes the relations we will have later with 
others. Thus, our beginning relations with others do not rely upon 
“recognition” and social abilities like “empathy”; rather they rely upon 
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bodily dialogue and utterances which begin, according to Kristeva, in the 
womb and continue to develop throughout our lives. 
Relational Identity as Narrative Co-Authorship 
While Kristeva has initiated this relational aspect of our personhood in 
her work on psychoanalysis, Paul Ricoeur develops a complementary 
account of personal identity.  Although Ricoeur chooses hermeneutics 
instead of psychoanalysis as his philosophical method, I believe that his 
account of a narrative identity is able to incorporate these insights from 
Kristeva and understand them as articulating similar phenomena on a 
different semantic plane. The most important insight from Kristeva’s 
account of our relational ego, is that our development begins prior to 
language. Paul Ricoeur’s account of narrative identity of the self in relation 
to others is, I believe, able to shed light on our dependency and vulnerability 
in our relations with others. On his account, we, as individuals, grow, 
change and develop over time through our encounters with others. How we 
define and identify ourselves is due partly to the actions we choose and 
partly to a character sedimented over time. 
 According to Ricoeur, how we come to find consistency in our identity 
while remaining dynamic, relational and continually in flux i is through our 
narrative relation with ourselves, with others, and with society. This is a 
dialectical relation that begins with the recognition of two parts of our 
identity: what Ricoeur calls “idem-identity” and “ipse-identity.”25 Idem-
identity, as Ricoeur writes, “unfolds an entire hierarchy of significations… In 
this hierarchy, permanence in time constitutes the highest orders, which will 
be opposed to that which differs, in the sense of changing or variable.”26 
Simply put, idem-identity concerns our character or sameness. Ipse-identity, 
by contrast, is that which idem-identity opposes and it concerns our 
personhood or selfhood. While idem-identity seeks to answer the question 
“What?”, it is ipse-identity which seeks to answer the question “Who?”.  Just 
as in literature the plot mediates between the disconnected events and the 
story, so our narrative identity is the mediation of idem-identity and ipse-
identity over time as we grow, develop, change and remain in many ways 
the same. It provides a dynamic unity-in-time to our selfhood. 
 Idem-identity and ipse-identity are interwoven in a dialectic of 
identity. Although Ricoeur does not write at length how this narrative 
identity affects our embodiment, he does describe it in the following 
manner: 
Insofar as the body as one’s own is a dimension of oneself, 
the imaginative variations around the corporeal condition 
are variations on the self and its selfhood. Furthermore, in 
virtue of the mediating function of the body as one’s own 
in the structure of being in the world, the feature of 
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selfhood belonging to corporeality is extended to that of 
the world as it is inhabited corporeally.27 
As my lived body mediates my being-in-the-world, so that mediation is a 
narrative mediation of my existential perspective. This narrative, lived 
embodiment is shared with and affected by others. As Ricoeur writes: “with 
need and lack, the otherness of the ‘other self’ moves to the forefront. The 
friend, inasmuch as he is that other self, has the role of providing what one 
is incapable of procuring for oneself.”28 Even though I myself have the 
world mediated to me through my narrative embodiment, I am not the sole 
author of my embodied existence. Instead, I am the co-author and my 
embodied existence is co-written with other people. 
This co-authorship of personhood has been shown in psychological 
cases of children with profound cognitive impairment and is paramount in 
our caring relations with family members and loved ones.29  When we 
consider those who may suffer from dementia, we realize that caring for a 
loved one with dementia is a form of reminding and reconstructing his or 
her personhood.30 The practice of reminding in dementia care is a process of 
aiding the patient in her memory loss of past abilities and experiences. Bruce 
Jennings, for instance, describes this process as relational: “minding and 
reminding come through the interaction that is at bottom about the 
exchange of meaning – the expression, offering, interpretation, and reception 
of meaning.”31 Because our identities are dynamic and relational, they are 
constructed “tissues of stories,” which involve both our first person 
experience of them but also include the “important acts, experiences, 
relationships, and commitments” that are shared with and given to us by 
others.32 The caring relation experienced with a loved one suffering from 
dementia, such as a grandmother, involves the caring practice of “holding” 
onto her identity. 
 Ricoeur stresses the role of reciprocity in relation to the other. This 
reciprocity is developed from neither capacity nor response alone, instead it 
is dialectical. Who I am is constituted by the other. This constitution takes 
place through solicitude: reciprocity takes place “in the exchange between 
human beings who esteem themselves.”33 This exchange involves giving 
and receiving.34 Within the fragile balance of giving and receiving, 
friendship lies in the middle of the spectrum. In friendship, according to 
Ricoeur, giving and receiving are equal and we share an equal vulnerability 
in interdependence.   
 Yet, many times our relations with others are unequal. Ricoeur 
designates one side of the unequal spectrum as benevolent spontaneity. In 
benevolent spontaneity, there is a dissymmetry in the relation “resulting 
from the primacy of the other in the situation of instruction, through the 
reverse moment of recognition.”35 Here the self recognizes the authority of 
the other. This might be an instance of justice but might also be an instance 
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of care. In the caring relation, this constitutes the parent-child relation or 
relation of the primary caregiver in a relation of development, instruction, 
and authority. And in this relation, many times the self is dependent upon 
the other. 
 In contrast to benevolent spontaneity, Ricoeur names the other’s 
dependency on the self as suffering. When the other is a suffering being, the 
other is dependent and has had a reduction or destruction in the capacity for 
acting.  Ricoeur describes this relation:  
here initiative, precisely in terms of being-able-to-act, 
seems to belong exclusively to the self who gives his 
sympathy, his compassion, these terms being taken in the 
strong sense of the wish to share someone else’s pain. 
Confronting this charity, this benevolence, the other 
appears to be reduced to the sole condition of receiving.36 
But this suffering is also a giving from the other for Ricoeur. Although the 
self and other are in a position of unequal vulnerability, the other when he 
or she is suffering reminds us of our own fragility and mortality. The other 
summons us to be ethical and to recognize value of human life as 
irreplaceable.  
A Narrative Ethics of Interdependent Persons 
At this point, I turn to examine how embodiment and impairment refigure 
this intention. To do so, it should first be noted that I will use the terms 
“dependent” or “dependency” to replace Ricoeur’s “suffering.” The term 
“dependency” more accurately represents the challenges for people with 
disabilities because they become “dependent on others” and “disabled” by 
our social environments, such as the lack of resources available or 
accessibility in buildings or public spaces. “Suffering,” by contrast, indicates 
physical or emotional pain and duress, which does not reflect the social 
challenges facing people with disabilities. Second, it is necessary that one 
recall the caring relation and consider the role of narrative in our 
interdependent relations. Our relations with others constitute the 
construction of ourselves. As children, we recognize our interdependence 
with others through our caring relations. As our bodies are relational bodies 
so others co-author our narratives with us. My series of caring relations 
finds a unity in the narrative that is my identity. But this unity is not only 
narrated by me; rather it is narrated with and through others.  Just as I am a 
narrative unity of idem and ipse over time, so my narrative unity is affected, 
mediated, and co-authored by other narrative unities. My narrative identity 
is affected and constructed by other narrative identities. Thus, my narrative 
identity is both pre-linguistic at times and is co-created with others.  
 And these narratives involve dependent relations with others. This 
dependent relation with others is part of our “existential vulnerability” and 
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that our identities are only complete through our commitment to others. 
Part of the responsibility caregivers hold is to co-author our narratives when 
we are vulnerable. Kittay describes the powerful story of her daughter 
Sesha’s narrative identity is already interwoven with her own mother and 
Sesha’s dependency caregiver Peggy: 
I am Sesha’s one mother. In truth, however, her mothering 
has been distributed across a number of individuals: her 
father, various caregivers, and Peggy. 
Sesha was four when a woman walked into our lives who 
came and stayed. How and where we acquired the 
instincts I don’t know, but we knew immediately that 
Peggy was right. She was scarcely interested in us. Her 
interview was with Sesha. But she wouldn’t take the job. 
Peggy feared the intensity of the involvement she knew 
was inevitable. We pleaded and increased the salary. She 
told me later she would never have taken the job if the 
agency hadn’t urged her to do a trial week. At the end of 
the week, it was already too late to quit. Sesha has worked 
her way into Peggy’s heart.37   
Although Sesha is fully dependent in her abilities, her participation in the 
construction of her parents’ and primary caregivers’ narrative lives is not. 
As both receiver of care and giver of care, Sesha has co-authored the 
narrative life of Peggy and others by adding dimensions to their worlds that 
they had not anticipated.  Peggy describes Sesha’s co-authorship as the 
following: 
I had been with Sesha in Central Park and I was working 
on some walking exercises that the folks at Rusk [Rusk 
Institute at New York University Medical Center, Sesha’s 
early intervention program] had assigned. I was working 
terribly hard trying to get Sesha to cooperate and do what 
I was supposed to get her to do. I sat her down in her 
stroller and sat down on a park bench. I realized that I was 
simply exhausted from the effort. I thought, how am I 
going to do this? How can I possibly do this job, when I 
looked down at Sesha and saw her little head pushed back 
against her stroller moving first to one side and then to 
another. I couldn’t figure out what she was doing. Until I 
traced what her eyes were fixed on. She had spotted a 
leave falling, and she was following its descent. I said 
“Thank you for being my teacher, Sesha. I see now. Not 
my way. Your way. Slowly” After that, I fully gave myself 
over to Sesha. That forged the bond.38 
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As both giving and receiving, Sesha and Peggy share lived experiences 
together even though Sesha is dependent and Peggy is her dependency 
worker. Through narration, together they co-author each other’s lives. Their 
interdependent narrative is the gift they share with each other. And this 
interdependent narrative underscores the fragility of the human condition. 
Kittay describes this fragility as follows: 
As I write this essay, a much older Peggy still cares for a 
much older Sesha in many of the same ways. But as Peggy 
and Sesha age, we reach the limits of the laboring aspect of 
caring… This is a difficult and troubling state of affairs – 
for us as parents, for Peggy, and, if Sesha understands it, 
for her. Sesha’s possible future without Peggy troubles me 
profoundly – not simply because we have come to so rely 
on her, but because I cannot bear the thought that such a 
central relationship in Sesha’s life could be sundered.39  
Thus, the fragility of our relations with others affects the narratives we 
share. Interdependency means shared vulnerability as well as capability, but 
it also means co-authorship. As narrating beings we act ethically and form a 
communal narrative ethic around the stories we tell.40 Likwise our co-
authorship with others provides a ground for an understanding of our 
human dignity as necessarily linked to others and to our communities. An 
example of a community which practices this narrative ethics is L’Arche, 
which was begun by Jean Vanier and welcomed those with disabilities who 
had been rejected in society just after World War II. Today, L’Arche has 
flourished as a welcoming communal model and has over 130 communities 
in 33 countries on 6 continents.41   
As a relational, narrative, dynamic agent, I am in interdependent 
and dependent relations with others. But these relations are not constructed 
strictly by capabilities; rather they are developed through a dialectic of 
giving and receiving. My relation to others in friendship forms a bond of 
equal vulnerability as we co-author each others’ lives. Yet, I can also form 
unequal friendships. I am also possibly in the position of caregiver or 
dependent. As a caregiver, I care for the dependent other and our relation is 
of unequal vulnerability. But that is not to say that there is unequal giving. 
My relation to the dependent other reminds me of my own fragility and 
vulnerability. I am only myself through the co-authorship of another and my 
narrative is shared with the one for whom I care. Thus, in the case of 
“Autism,” by having the relation between those caring, their narratives are 
already interwoven to develop an interdependent gift which reminds of that 
fragile bond. 
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Relational Moral Personhood 
Kristeva and Ricoeur’s proposal of our identities as relational responds 
to Singer and McMahan’s attack on cognitive disability and provides an 
alternative account of moral personhood for people with disabilities. 
Although Singer and McMahan have argued that analytical intelligence and 
certain skill sets serve as the foundation for moral personhood, they are 
incorrect about what constitutes our personhood over time and thus gives us 
dignity and moral status. Our dignity, rather, is a relational and 
interdependent dignity: as humans we exist with and for each other. 
Furthermore, as narrating and temporal beings, we understand our 
personhood as inextricably linked with other persons who care for us and 
for who we care throughout our lives. Finally, our narrative personhood is 
not developed or constituted by capacity; instead it recognizes our own 
vulnerability as persons and our necessary dependence upon the ethical 
intentions of others. Our moral personhood is a relational personhood because 
our dignity is given to us through our relations with others. A moral identity 
is not autonomous self-authorship, but rather constituted by relational co-
authorship that develops over time. Thus, our moral personhood is not 
defined by mutual advantage or independent capacity. By contrast, it is 
defined by the mutual gift we give to each other in both our shared 
vulnerability and to whom we are morally bound. Who counts, then, as a 
moral person? Those who can and do enter into this sort of interdependent, 
fragile and ethical existence. Sesha clearly qualifies as a person and co-
authors Kittay and Peggy’s lives in their shared narrative.  
The story of Sesha and Peggy remind us of our own fragility and 
that we are not the sole authors of our lives. As a relational, narrative, 
dynamic person, I am in interdependent and dependent relations with 
others. But these relations are not constructed strictly by capabilities; rather 
they are developed through a dialectic of giving and receiving. My relation 
to others in friendship forms a bond of equal vulnerability as we co-author 
each others’ lives. Yet, I am also in the position of caregiver or dependent at 
various moments throughout my life due to age, impairment or illness. As a 
caregiver, I care for the dependent other and our relation is of unequal 
vulnerability. But that is not to say that there is unequal giving. My relation 
to the dependent other expands and develops my identity through the 
narrative we share. I am only myself through the co-authorship of another 
and my narrative is shared with the one for whom I care. Just as Peggy, 
Sesha’s devoted caregiver, gauges her own needs through the needs of her 
dependent other, so those needs are caught up in interdependent narratives 
of caregiver and dependent. Therefore, in the cases of disability, my moral 
status cannot be limited to only reason or social ability. Rather, it is a 
narrated moral status which in its relation with others reminds us of the 
fragile bond that makes us vulnerable. It reminds of what makes us human.  
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